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Abstract 
Existing accounts of counterterrorist policies posit that defensively oriented measures create 
negative externalities and result in regulatory competition inducing governments to increas-
ingly tighten their policies. We argue that rather than causing an unconditional global ‘race to 
the top’, spatial dependence in counterterrorist policies is limited to within groups of countries 
exposed to a similar level of threat from international terrorism. Countries strongly differ in 
their propensity to become the target of an international terror attack and governments can 
safely ignore counterterrorist policies enacted by countries outside their ‘peer group’, but 
must pay attention to measures undertaken by their peers. We test several predictions derived 
from our theory in an empirical analysis of counterterrorist regulations in 20 Western devel-
oped country democracies over the period 2001 to 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks mark a watershed for counterterrorist policies in Western countries. 
The collapsing towers of the World Trade Center raised doubts about the security of Western 
citizens not in some far away dangerous foreign land but on their own domestic soil – doubts 
that policy-makers needed to address quickly, comprehensively, convincingly, and 
effectively. Yet, while the attacks had the expected demand side shock (Sandler 2010) in that 
voters in all Western countries were willing to accept restrictions on liberties and freedoms in 
the form of stricter counterterrorist policies, the regulatory response to the 9/11 attacks was 
markedly heterogeneous and uneven, with some countries enacting new policies 
comprehensively, whilst others did comparatively little (Epifanio 2011). In this article, we 
study why this was the case, focusing on cross-country spill-over effects that give rise to peer 
group specific spatial dependence in counterterrorist policies. 
That one country’s counterterrorist policies are affected by other countries’ policies – the 
definition of spatial policy dependence – is not a new insight. Counterterrorist policies under-
taken in one country exert externalities onto other countries. In a series of papers, Todd 
Sandler and co-authors have drawn a distinction between pre-emptive policies such as dis-
mantling terrorists’ training camps or freezing their assets on the one hand and defensive poli-
cies such as protecting airports and other infrastructure and cross-referencing passport details 
with previously collected databases on the other hand (see, for example, Sandler and Lapan 
1988; Arce and Sandler 2005; Sandler 2005; Sandler and Siqueira 2006; Bandyopadyay and 
Sandler et al. 2011). By pro-actively seeking to destroy terrorist groups, pre-emptive policies 
undertaken by one country generate positive externalities for all other countries faced by the 
same terrorist threat, rendering all affected countries safer. When one country invests more, 
other countries have an incentive to invest less such that pre-emptive policies are likely to be 
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under-supplied globally. In contrast, by exclusively protecting domestic targets against ter-
rorist threats, defensive counterterrorist policies impose some negative externalities onto other 
countries.  
Another major contribution in terms of understanding the incentives of governments to invest 
in distinct stylized categories of counterterrorist policies comes from Bueno de Mesquita 
(2007) who argues that in response to electoral pressures governments over-supply observable 
policies aimed at defending specific targets at the expense of unobservable policies aimed at 
combating terrorist threats in general. Since observable policies such as airport security 
measures largely overlap with defensive policies and unobservable policies such as the infil-
tration of terrorist cells and other intelligence measures tend to be pre-emptive policies, the 
two major existing accounts of counterterrorist policy choice converge in some of their central 
predictions, if for different reasons. 
We provide an alternative theoretical account of defensive counterterrorist policies in the 
wake of 9/11. We argue that negative externalities do not create a general ‘race to the top’ 
with all countries resorting to increasingly stringent policies over time. Such externalities do 
indeed result in regulatory competition (Vogel 1995; Genschel and Plümper 1997), but coun-
tries are not equally and indiscriminately affected by counterterrorist policies from all other 
countries. The existence of heterogeneous threat levels alters the strategic game between gov-
ernments. Governments do not compare their own national counterterrorist policies to those of 
all other countries. Instead, they will look toward policies of their “peers” in terms of other 
countries with a similar level of threat from international terrorism and will ignore policies 
undertaken by countries outside their peer group. Rather than avoiding falling behind all other 
countries in terms of counterterrorist policies, countries merely avoid falling behind the poli-
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cies of their peers. In other words, we develop a theory that predicts peer group specific spa-
tial dependence in counterterrorist policies among countries of similar threat level. 
Empirically, our contribution is to provide the first quantitative evidence of spatial depend-
ence in counterterrorist policies. The existing literature is either game-theoretical citing only 
casual empirical evidence in support of its propositions (e.g., Arce and Sandler 2005; Sandler 
and Siqueira 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Powell 2007), or provides only qualitative and 
descriptive evidence on convergence/divergence in counterterrorist policies (e.g., Nohrstedt 
and Hansén 2010). Employing a new dataset originally constructed by one of the authors 
(Epifanio 2011), we provide evidence largely consistent with our hypotheses and robust to a 
range of changes to model specification in an empirical analysis of counter-terrorist policies 
in Western developed country democracies over the period 2001 to 2008. 
2.  A Theory of Peer Group Specific Spatial Policy Dependence in Counterterrorist 
Policies  
In this section, we explain why some of the marked variation in the regulatory response to the 
9/11 attacks is a consequence of peer group specific spatial dependence in counterterrorist 
policies. We develop our argument in two steps. First, we make a counterfactual argument 
about the political response to the 9/11 shock in the absence of externalities. In a second step, 
we augment this simple argument by allowing for externalities. Throughout this section and 
our empirical analysis we focus on international terrorism as opposed to purely domestic 
terrorism. Over the period of our study, the terrorist threat to Western democracies, or at least 
the perception of threat by the governments of these countries, was dominated by 
internationally operating Islamist terrorist groups.  
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2.1. The Counterfactual Political Equilibrium in a World of Independent Policy Choices 
The spatial dependence literature typically assumes that policies are in equilibrium and are 
propelled out of equilibrium by an increase in inter-dependence – e.g. the abolition of inter-
national capital controls (Wilson and Wildasin 2004; Plümper et al. 2009). We cannot make 
this simplifying assumption because all governments in Western democracies had an incen-
tive to change their counter-terrorist regulations after the shock of 9/11. We therefore have to, 
firstly, explain the counterfactual political response to international terrorism in the absence of 
spatial policy dependence. Thus, this sub-section explores reasons behind the differential 
policy response of Western democracies to the events of 9/11 in a counterfactual world of 
independent policy choices. 
The micro-foundations of our theory are in line with recent political economy models of 
counterterrorist policies (e.g., Bueno de Mesqita 2007). These models assume governments to 
be opportunistic and responsive to shifts in voter preferences. Since voters shifted their pref-
erences towards security after 9/11, governments have an incentive to increase counterterror-
ist activities. While Bueno de Mesquita is mainly interested in the choice of counterterrorist 
instruments, we aim at explaining cross-country variation in countries’ shift toward tighter 
counterterrorist policies. 
Opportunistic models of counterterrorist policy choices assume that these policies are benefi-
cial to voters. They increase what one might call homeland security. However, these policies 
do not come for free. The costs of counterterrorist policies are partly budgetary, as in Bueno 
de Mesquita’s model. For example, the official budget of the US Department of Homeland 
Security is 57 billion US$.1 Security is costly and voters ceteris paribus favor lower taxes. 
Therefore, counterterrorist policies are subject to a budget constraint.  
                                                 
1
  http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/budget/dhs-budget.shtm (last accessed 29 July 2012). 
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This is not the only cost, however. Counterterrorist policies also affect voters’ lives in many 
ways, some subtle, others less so. Delays at airports caused by increased security checks or 
the nuisance of having to take off one’s shoes and belt and the loss of creams, perfumes and 
other liquids at security checks represent a burden to citizens. Other policies such as the use of 
full body-scanners, the installation of a comprehensive DNA database, the extensive use of 
closed circuit television (CCTV), or the introduction of biometric passports all restrict civil 
rights and liberties. In addition, counterterrorist policies conflict with the ideological prefer-
ences of some voters.  
As a consequence of counterterrorist policies being costly, voters will only support such poli-
cies to the extent they see themselves in need of a marked improvement in their security as 
otherwise there is little benefit from tightened counterterrorist policies. This, in turn, depends 
on the level of the terrorist threat citizens of a country are exposed to. Voters are more willing 
to accept the costs of counterterrorist policies if the threat from international terrorism and 
consequently the need for increased security is high and less so if the threat from international 
terrorism is low.  
We do not deny that counterterrorist policies that are burdensome and severely restrict civil 
rights and liberties can find support among an electorate, which is eager to see decisive gov-
ernment action against the terrorist threat, given such policies represent a clearly visible coun-
terterrorist strategy. Nor do we deny that in certain circumstances they can even be preferred 
by the electorate to less visible, but also less intrusive (for citizens) general pre-emptive 
counterterrorist policies, just as Bueno de Mesquita (2007) argues. However, we argue that 
governments are more likely to implement a broad set of burdensome and rights-restricting 
counterterrorist policies when the threat level from terrorism is high.  
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2.2. Causes of Peer Group Specific Spatial Policy Dependence in Counterterrorist Policies 
So far, we have developed a theory of the legislative response to international terrorism that 
assumes governments act independently of each other. Of course, this assumption is not real-
istic. Todd Sandler and co-authors have long since pointed out that counterterrorist policies 
create externalities (Sandler and Lapan 1988; Arce and Sandler 2005; Sandler and Siqueira 
2006; Bandyopadyay and Sandler 2011). Some of these are positive externalities, increasing 
security in other countries, thus providing them with a public good. For example, if one coun-
try infiltrates and destroys an international terrorist cell, other countries will become slightly 
safer. Unfortunately, when pre-emptive counterterrorist policies generate positive externali-
ties, governments have an incentive to under-supply them.2 
Predominantly defensive counterterrorist policies, on the other hand, generate negative exter-
nalities. An increase in the effectiveness of policies aimed at the defense of domestic targets 
in one country may increase the risk level in other countries. This happens if terrorist groups 
regard potential targets as functional substitutes for the purpose of furthering their strategic 
objectives, seeking out the weakest link among similarly attractive targets for terrorist attacks. 
In this case, a significant increase in the effectiveness of counter-terrorist policies in, say, the 
United States may instigate terrorist groups to seek softer targets from other countries, say 
from the United Kingdom.  
                                                 
2
  Governments can coordinate their policy response to overcome the adverse effects of positive 
externalities. Yet, multilateral coordination efforts have, at best, been modestly successful (Bianchi 
2006, Laborde and DeFeo 2006, Nuotio 2006, Nohrstedt and Hansén 2010). UN conventions leave 
signatory countries a great amount of discretion in the process of implementation and the lack of 
enforcement measures makes most of these agreements de facto ineffective (Sandler 2003). Despite an 
extremely high benefit-cost ratio, many countries do not fully participate in Interpol’s coordination 
efforts (Enders and Sandler 2011; Sandler, Arce and Enders 2011). In addition to standard collective 
action problems, domestic cultural, historical, institutional and constitutional constraints limit anti-
terrorist cooperation (Katzenstein 2003; Sandler 2010) which, to be effective, must actively encompass 
the largest number of countries.  
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Because terrorist groups, ceteris paribus, have an incentive to attack the softest target, the 
existence of negative externalities creates regulatory competition in which governments have 
an incentive not to fall behind and to make sure they do not have significantly fewer or less 
effective counterterrorist policies in place than other countries, which international terrorists 
would regard as equally attractive potential targets. Accordingly, negative externalities have 
the potential to generate a ‘race to the top’ in counterterrorist regulations with ‘laggard’ gov-
ernments willing to surrender civil rights and liberties beyond what they would have deemed 
optimal in the counterfactual optimal policy case without externalities. 
However, regulatory competition in counterterrorist policies does not lead to a general ‘race 
to the top’. Terrorist groups’ ultimate objective is a fundamental change in policy or even 
regime change in their own country or region (Crenshaw 1981, 1998; Pape 2003, 2005; Kydd 
and Walter 2006; Plümper and Neumayer 2010a, Neumayer and Plümper 2009, 2011). Some 
Western countries take on a much more active role than others in thwarting, stalling and, pos-
sibly, defeating this objective in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. They provide 
more military aid, station more troops, train more security personnel, export more arms and 
supply more economic and political support to governments embattled in a fight with terror-
ists who want to seize political control and power away from them. Also, the ultimate objec-
tive of policy or regime change notwithstanding, which is typically unachievable in the short 
run, terrorist groups’ short-term strategic goals revolve around gaining peer support, recruit-
ing new members, and attracting media attention (Rohner and Frey 2007; Plümper and Neu-
mayer, Neumayer and Plümper 2009, 2011). Here as well, attacking citizens from some 
Western countries proves much more attractive and effective in furthering these short-term 
goals than attacking citizens from other countries. Simply put, harming or killing a British or 
American citizen is much more valuable to terrorists than killing a Swedish or Portuguese 
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national.3 Not all potential targets are equally relevant for achieving the terrorists’ short-term 
strategic goals or long-term ultimate policy objectives. Thus, targets in different countries are 
not perfect substitutes to terrorist groups: the threat level in different countries varies because 
attacking nationals from different countries has varying strategic value for terrorist groups. 
In sum, then, the negative externalities inflicted by effective defensive counterterrorist poli-
cies in one country onto other countries does not generate a general ‘race to the top’ because 
sufficiently strong externalities only exist between countries that are functional substitutes for 
international terrorist groups. As a consequence, regulatory competition leads to spatial policy 
dependence within groups of countries with similar propensities to become the target of 
specific international terrorist groups. With the threat of international terrorism to Western 
democracies in the post-9/11 era dominated by essentially the same internationally operating 
Islamist groups in their various shades, forms and disguises, this simplifies to regulatory 
competition among countries at similar propensities to become the target of international 
terrorism. For a country with very low propensity such as, for example, Finland or New 
Zealand there is no need to orient itself toward the counter-terrorist policies of countries such 
as the USA and the UK, which are much more threatened by international terrorism. 
2.3. Summary of Predictions 
Our theory allows us to make a number of predictions regarding counterterrorist policies in 
Western democracies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Our first prediction follows from our 
argument that counterterrorist policies impose costs on citizens and that governments in 
countries exposed to a greater level of threat from international terrorism find it easier to enact 
                                                 
3
  We provide a broader discussion of the strategic logic of international terrorism and why certain 
nationalities are preferably targeted in Plümper and Neumayer (2010a) and Neumayer and Plümper 
(2009, 2011). Because of space constraints we cannot discuss the details of this theory here.  
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stricter policies since this raises the expected benefits of such policies than governments in 
countries where the threat level is lower. The perceived threat level thus impacts on whether 
security or civil rights and liberty concerns dominate. This leads to our first testable 
hypothesis: Countries with higher exposure to the threat from international terrorism enact 
more counter-terrorist policies than countries with lower exposure. 
Countries do not enact counterterrorist policies independently of each other, however. Instead, 
negative externalities result in regulatory competition and spatial policy dependence. How-
ever, a universal ‘race to the top’ is unlikely to occur in counterterrorist policies. Western 
countries are not fully substitutable for each other in the strategic decision-making of interna-
tional terrorists. Negative externalities from defensive counterterrorist measures only affect 
countries at roughly the same level of threat from international terrorism. Switzerland can 
safely ignore US counterterrorist decision-making, but British politicians cannot. We 
therefore formulate as our second hypothesis: Countries spatially depend in their 
counterterrorist policy decisions only on other countries with a similar level of exposure to 
the threat from international terrorism, not on other countries with a different level of 
exposure. 
We have argued that negative externalities are the dominant cause of peer group specific spa-
tial policy dependence for the predominantly defensive measures that are the focus of our 
empirical analysis. There exist potentially other causes of spatial counterterrorist policy de-
pendence such as learning and power. Like others before us, we cannot neatly separate one 
causal mechanism from the other in our empirical analysis. However, if our argument is cor-
rect then one testable implication of regulatory competition as the dominant source of spatial 
policy dependence is that countries that are lagging behind the mean of policies within their 
group should respond more strongly to any spatial policy stimulus from other countries within 
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their group than countries above the mean. Such conditional spatial policy dependence (Neu-
mayer and Plümper 2012) is the consequence of laggards being more exposed to negative 
externalities than frontrunners, which are already “ahead of the pack”. Our third and final 
prediction states that countries which are below the average policy level within their group 
will respond more strongly to the spatial policy effect from their peer countries than countries 
above the mean policy level. 
3. Research Design  
In this section, we discuss the empirical research design chosen for testing the predictions 
developed from our theory. We start with a description of our dependent variable and estima-
tion technique. We then explain how we model peer group specific spatial policy dependence 
and briefly discuss alternative, complementary theories which we account for via control vari-
ables. 
3.1 The Dependent Variables and Estimation Technique 
In Epifanio (2011), one of the present authors has introduced an originally coded database on 
the legislative response to international terrorism in 20 Western developed country democra-
cies over the period 2000 to 2008. She codes 30 potential regulations governments can im-
plement, covering restrictions to privacy rights, restrictions to procedural rights, and re-
strictions to the rights enjoyed by immigrants and foreigners. Restrictions to privacy rights 
encompass restrictions of the right to physical, informational or spatial privacy. Compulsory 
biometric passport information and the establishment of a DNA database are examples of 
restrictions to physical privacy; the tracking, acquisition and retention of information on the 
communication and movement patterns of people exemplify restrictions to informational pri-
vacy; whilst surveillance tools such as closed circuit television (CCTV) or number plate 
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recognition systems are examples of restrictions to spatial privacy. Restrictions to procedural 
rights are those policies that introduce new crimes relating to the glorification, support or re-
cruitment of terrorism as well as policies that limit the rights and liberties of suspects, for ex-
ample, exceptional procedural measures such as detention for a prescribed period without a 
formal charge and restrictions on the personal freedom of suspects such as house arrest and 
restrictions on movement within a country or the right to leave the country. Restrictions to 
rights enjoyed by immigrants and foreigners cover policies such as the refusal of entry, the 
revocation of citizenship of naturalized citizens and the deportation of foreigners. 
As our dependent variable we take the total number of restrictions in place in any one country 
year. By taking the number of restrictions in place we make the simplifying assumption that 
regulations are substitutes for each other – which they are but not perfectly so – and that the 
larger the number of regulations the stricter are counterterrorist policies. This is certainly in-
correct if one is to take this assumption literally, but one has to keep in mind that the number 
of implemented regulations after 09/11 varies largely. There is no reason to assume that a 
couple of regulations offer as effective a counterterrorist strategy as twenty or twenty-five 
regulations. Therefore, we claim that the number of regulations is a good proxy for the strict-
ness of counterterrorist regulations. True, this variable will suffer from some random meas-
urement error, but its inferential information is far larger than the data uncertainty.  
By looking at the legislative counterterrorist response we focus on the regulatory aspect of 
counterterrorist policies. Our measures do not capture counterterrorist policies in the form of 
larger spending on police, military and secret service. Nor do they capture pre-emptive poli-
cies such as undercover surveillance and intelligence operations. True, CCTV, biometric pass-
port information, and other regulations could assist intelligence operations, but the measures 
we look at are clearly predominantly defensive in nature. 
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Our dependent variable is the number of regulations in place. With the data showing no signs 
of significant over-dispersion, we use a Poisson rather than negative binomial estimator with 
standard errors clustered on countries. We restrict the sample to the period from 2001, i.e. 
from the year of the 9/11 attacks onwards, to 2008, the latest year for which we have data on 
the dependent variables. The sample is fully balanced, covering 20 countries over 8 years, 
resulting in 160 observations. Figure 1 shows graphs on the development of the number of 
policies in place in each country (grouped by threat level) over the sample period together 
with transformations of the two spatial lag variables, the construction of which we describe 
now.4 
3.2  Peer Group Specific Spatial Policy Dependence 
We argue that Western democracies in the post-9/11 period spatially depend on their peer 
groups, defined in terms of similar exposure to the threat from international terrorism. The 
propensity to become the target of international terrorists is a latent variable and cannot be 
directly observed. One way of measuring it is to simply take a country’s actual experience 
with international terrorism as a proxy for its latent propensity to become a target. An 
arguably better way is to take the predictions from a structural estimation model of the 
determinants of international terrorism, which captures better the latent propensity to become 
the target of international terrorists, which by definition is a non-observable concept. 
Whether one takes actual or predicted values, another question is whether it is terrorist inci-
dents that matter or the number of people killed. We believe incidents to be more informative 
as they capture all attacks deliberately chosen by terrorist groups and undertaken with the 
                                                 
4
  The transformation reverts the log-transformation of the variable to be spatially lagged (see section 3.2), 
which keeps the domestic regulations and transformed spatial lag variables in the same unit of 
measurement. 
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intention to inflict death or at least serious harm, whereas the number of people killed is 
somewhat random given that few terror plots succeed in creating fatalities, even fewer suc-
ceed in killing many people, whilst the majority of attacks do not result in fatalities. Another 
more pragmatic reason is that our data source does not individually identify the nationality of 
all persons killed, such that we need to attribute the entire death toll of an attack to the nation 
whose citizens were the primary victims. What speaks for looking at killings, however, is that 
voters’ perception may be more affected by the death toll of terrorism than the total number of 
attacks and policy makers need to take voters’ perception into account. 
Yet, table 1 reveals that notwithstanding the importance of these theoretical considerations, 
from a practical perspective it does not matter all that much which proxy we rely on to iden-
tify the unobservable propensity to become the target of international terrorists and ultimately 
the peer groups. The second column of table 1 shows the rounded predicted number of terror-
ist incidents derived from a negative binomial regression model based on a specification in-
formed by an opportunistic and strategic theory of international terrorism (Neumayer and 
Plümper 2009; Plümper and Neumayer 2010a). Specifically, the total number of terrorist inci-
dents over the period 2001 to 2008 in which a country’s nationals were either the only victims 
or, in case of victims from multiple nations, were the principal victims,5 as identified by the 
“International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (Iterate) database (Mickolus et al. 
2003),6 was regressed on a country’s income, income per capita, share of Muslim population, 
the log of number of troops sent to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, military expenditures 
                                                 
5
  Our data source identifies the first three primary nationalities of victims of terrorist incidents for those 
incidents where more than one nationality is affected, which is the case in a minority of incidents. 
Results are hardly affected if we attribute each incident with multi-nation victims to the primary, 
secondary and tertiary nationality involved equally. 
6
  Importantly, Iterate excludes all terrorism that is purely domestic. This is opportune since we are 
interested in how countries reacted to the changing perception of the threat from international terrorism 
after the 9/11 attacks.  
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per GDP and total number of military alliances. Countries of larger size, richer countries and 
countries with a larger share of Muslim population provide greater opportunity for interna-
tional (Islamist) terrorists, whereas military interference in foreign countries provides terror-
ists with greater strategic incentive to target a specific country. Higher military expenditures 
per GDP function as a proxy for pre-emptive counterterrorist measures, which may reduce the 
risk of becoming victimized. Note that the data on terrorism covers attacks against nationals 
of a country independently of where the attack took place. This is important: simply because, 
for example, Homeland Security has managed to keep the number of attacks on American soil 
extremely low does not change the fact that the US is a country whose nationals are at high 
risk of becoming victimized. 
If we take predicted incidents as our proxy, then clearly countries differ quite dramatically in 
the extent to which their nationals are exposed to the threat of international terrorism. There 
are three clusters of countries discernible, as the second column of table 1 shows. First, there 
is the group of countries with low threat, defined as those with less than 10 predicted incidents 
over this period, namely Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. A second group of countries with intermediate exposure, 
exhibiting more than 10, but less than 50 predicted incidents consists of Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Two countries clearly stick out, namely the 
highly exposed UK with more than 50 predicted incidents and the USA with several hundred 
predicted incidents. The predicted number of incidents tracks the actual number of terrorist 
incidents suffered by a country’s nationals remarkably well (column 3). Country classification 
does not change very much if we use a model that predicts killings (column 4).7 Compared to 
                                                 
7
  The number of fatalities, both predicted and actual, is higher than that of incidents, so we set the 
threshold from which a country enters the medium and high threat categories slightly higher at 15 and 
100 (instead of 10 and 50), respectively. 
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predicted incidents, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands move from the medium to the 
high risk group, whereas Belgium, New Zealand and Sweden move from low to medium risk. 
The predicted number of killings tracks the actual number of actual killings sufficiently well 
for the classification not to be dramatically different either (column 5). Accordingly, the 
clustering of countries into distinct peer groups does not depend much on the proxy for expo-
sure to terrorism. 
Note that table 1 assumes the propensity to become the target of international terrorists to be 
constant over the period 2001 to 2008. Given the relatively short time period, we believe this 
is justified as a first approximation. Also note that single events that happened between the 
9/11 attacks and 2008 – such as the Madrid, London or Bali bombings or the events following 
the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed – affected all Western countries, not 
just the ones most immediately involved in these events, such that the grouping of countries 
does not necessarily shift during this time period as a result of these events. 
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Table 1. Potential classification schemes for grouping countries into levels of threat from international terrorism. 
Country predicted incidents actual incidents predicted killings actual killings 
 number classification number classification number classification number classification 
Australia 12 medium 7 low 140 high 227 high 
Austria 1 low 0 low 1 low 0 low 
Belgium 8 low 11 medium 20 medium 9 low 
Canada 18 medium 17 medium 34 medium 26 medium 
Denmark 5 low 3 low 11 low 6 low 
Finland 1 low 1 low 6 low 2 low 
France 25 medium 25 medium 19 medium 30 medium 
Germany 18 medium 21 medium 331 high 69 medium 
Greece 1 low 2 low 0 low 0 low 
Ireland 1 low 3 low 3 low 2 low 
Italy 21 medium 30 medium 76 medium 45 medium 
Netherlands 24 medium 13 medium 118 high 34 medium 
New Zealand 3 low 0 low 26 medium 0 low 
Norway 4 low 2 low 6 low 9 low 
Portugal 2 low 0 low 0 low 0 low 
Spain 10 medium 11 medium 53 medium 208 high 
Sweden 3 low 4 low 17 medium 29 medium 
Switzerland 2 low 4 low 4 low 8 low 
United Kingdom 62 high 77 high 261 high 135 high 
United States 338 high 316 high 1090 high 1097 high 
 
 
Note: Relevant period is 2001 to 2008. See text for details on source and computation. Predicted incidents and killings rounded to next integer. 
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In our main estimations, we take the country classifications from predicted incidents as the 
basis for determining peer groups, but we show in robustness tests that our inferences uphold 
if we assume one of the three alternative country classifications instead or use a classification 
based on data from before our period of study. The fact that our inferences are robust to using 
any one of these five different country group classifications should also provide reassurance 
that our results are not driven by any particular way in which we categorize countries into 
peer groups.  
To test our hypothesis that spatial policy dependence only emanates from other peer countries 
with a similar level of exposure, we constructed separate spatial lag variables, one in which 
only countries of the same group are presumed to have an effect on the country of observation 
(spatial lag (peers)) and another one in which only countries outside the same group are pre-
sumed to have an effect (spatial lag (non-peers)). The spatial lags are row-standardized and 
represent the average level of policies in the peer group and non-peer group of countries, re-
spectively, but excluding of course the country under observation.  
Hays and Franzese (2009) show that using spatially-lagged observed counts as regressors in 
Poisson estimation leads to inconsistent estimates. They provide Monte Carlo evidence sug-
gesting that a Poisson estimation model in which ln(y+1) rather than the count of y itself en-
ters the spatial lag variable performs well in terms of bias and root mean squared error. In 
fact, this “naïve” spatial count data model performs almost as well as computationally much 
more demanding non-linear least squares and generalized method of moments estimators, 
which fully incorporate the simultaneity arising from the spatial dependence. For these rea-
sons, we use ln(y+1) in the generation of the spatial lag variables in our Poisson regressions. 
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3.3. Other Explanatory Variables  
Our first hypothesis predicts that the level of exposure to the threat of international terrorism 
directly affects counterterrorist policies, independently of spatial policy dependence. We 
measure the variable International terrorist threat by the predicted number of incidents over 
the 2001-2008 period, as listed in the second column of table 1 above.8 
The regulatory response to international terrorism after the 9/11 attacks is also influenced by 
other factors and there are potentially other causes of spatial policy dependence as well. To 
start with, political institutions may influence the counterterrorist response to 09/11. Many 
observers argue that international terrorism opened a window of opportunity for right-wing 
governments to shift the balance between security and civil freedom towards the former 
(Moeckli 2008, Welch and Schuster 2005). In contrast, liberal and possibly left-wing parties 
pay more attention to defending civil rights of their citizens. We therefore include two 
variables measuring the share of government cabinet portfolios held by, respectively, right-
wing and left-wing parties (as opposed to centrist parties) with data taken from the 
Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2008 (Armingeon et al. 2010). 
Second, some countries, especially Spain, the UK, Germany, and Italy experienced organized 
domestic terrorism long before 9/11. Some countries even had experience with international 
terrorism from extremist Islamist groups on their own soil, such as Germany in 1972, the 
USA in 1993 and France in 1994. These countries already had regulations in place that coun-
ter potential terrorist attacks. We therefore control for ‘initial conditions’ – the level of 
counterterrorist policies in place in 2000 in the countries under observation.  
                                                 
8
  In the robustness tests, in which we switch to actual incidents or predicted (actual) killings as the 
underlying measure, we also change this variable accordingly. 
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Third, governments may learn from each others’ policies, which could result in spatial policy 
dependence independently of regulatory competition caused by negative externalities. Also, 
the targets most affected by international terrorism can exert pressure or even coercion on 
laggards to ratchet up their counterterrorist policies. Some have noted how the US and other 
large donor countries have used aid in order to buy stricter and better enforced counterterrorist 
policies in recipient countries (Azam and Thelen 2010). However, the prospects for pressure 
is limited among Western developed countries who do not receive aid from the US and are 
not easily bullied into adopting policies they do not want. There can be exceptions, of course. 
The automatic transmission of detailed passenger information to US authorities prior to de-
parture for trans-Atlantic flights was imposed on many European nations against their will. 
The exceptional nature of this example is immediately apparent as well, however: the US had 
great leverage since the flights in question land on its territory. For almost any other counter-
terrorist measure there is no direct leverage that the US, or any other country for that matter, 
has over other countries. In robustness tests, we control for learning as a cause of spatial de-
pendence with an unweighted and for power/coercion with a power-weighted spatial lag vari-
able – see section 5 for details. 
Finally, as a further control variable, we include a country’s gross domestic product per capita 
(in thousands of real Dollars), given that richer countries are likely to have a stronger prefer-
ence for civil rights and liberties than poorer countries (data from World Bank 2011). Lastly, 
we control for a general tendency toward stricter counterterrorist policies by including a linear 
year variable. The appendix provides descriptive statistical variable information. 
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4. Results 
In this section, we report our main estimation results, whilst the next section tests the robust-
ness of our inferences to plausible changes in model specification. We present coefficients, 
which in Poisson regression can be interpreted as semi-elasticities (Cameron and Trivedi 
2009: 336). In model 1 of table 2, we estimate one unconditional peer group specific spatial 
policy effect, whereas in model 2 we allow this effect to be different for countries below the 
mean of their group compared to countries above the mean. Consistent with our first two hy-
potheses, we find that countries with a higher exposure to the threat from international terror-
ism have more policies in place and spatial policy dependence originates only from the peer 
group of countries on other countries within that same group, whereas the spatial lag variable 
of the non-peer group has no statistically significant effect. Richer countries have fewer 
counterterrorist policies in place, whereas the political orientation of governments has no sta-
tistically significant influence. 
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Table 2. Estimation Results. 
 
  (1) (2) 
International terrorist threat 0.00167** 0.000647** 
 (0.000246) (0.000112) 
Spatial lag (peers) 0.762** 0.625** 
 (0.0726) (0.0643) 
Spatial lag (non-peers) 0.0160 -0.0770 
 (0.163) (0.0858) 
Below group mean dummy 
 -1.864** 
 
 (0.357) 
Bel mean dum * SL (peers) 
 0.524** 
 
 (0.116) 
Initial policy level in 2000 0.0201** 0.00781* 
 (0.00735) (0.00389) 
GDP per capita 
-0.0181** -0.00271 
 (0.00539) (0.00218) 
% gov_left 
-0.00188 -0.000701 
 (0.00150) (0.000769) 
% gov_right 
-0.00108 -0.000190 
 (0.00154) (0.000793) 
year 0.0312 0.0271* 
 (0.0190) (0.0123) 
 
 
Note: Poisson regressions on number of counter-terrorist policies in place. N = 160. Standard errors clustered on 
country in brackets. Coefficient of constant not reported.  
* statistically significant at 0.05, or ** 0.01 level. 
 
Representing semi-elasticities, the results can be interpreted as indicating that, for example, 
every one thousand dollar increase in GDP per capita reduces the number of counterterrorist 
regulations a government implements by 1.81 percent. Likewise, a one unit increase in the 
value of the peer group specific spatial lag variable increases it by 76.2 percent. However, 
these semi-elasticities do not facilitate an assessment of the substantive importance of effects. 
This is particularly the case for the spatial lag variables, which were constructed using the 
spatially lagged ln(y+1) rather than y for reasons explained above. For substantive effects, we 
therefore interpret the change in predicted counts following a specified change in the variable 
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of interest, holding all other variables at mean values. Moving the peer group specific spatial 
lag variable from its 25th to its 75th percentile value increases the predicted count of counter-
terrorist policies in place by slightly more than 7 and thus by a little more than the sample 
standard deviation in counterterrorist policies. This suggests the existence of a substantively 
important spatial effect. In comparison, the threat from international terrorism variable has a 
much smaller effect on predicted counts of policies if one looks at the same shift from the 25th 
to the 75th percentile of this variable, which increases the predicted number of counterterrorist 
policies by only around one third of a policy. Note, however, that this variable is highly 
skewed and that it has a standard deviation almost three times larger than its mean. The sub-
stantive effect becomes much stronger if we move this variable from the 25th percentile to the 
more extreme 95th percentile. This results in a change in predicted counts of counterterrorist 
regulations of around 4.5, which is still much smaller than the substantive effect of spatial 
policy dependence. Note also that this effect occurs almost exclusively on the right side of the 
distribution: at very high levels of threat.  
Model 2 tests our third hypothesis, which is based on an implication of regulatory competition 
as the dominant source of spatial policy dependence in defensive counter-terrorist policies. 
We find that countries with policy levels below the mean of their peer groups are estimated to 
be more responsive to the spatial effect than countries above the mean. This can be discerned 
from the positive and statistically significant interaction effect between the dummy variable 
indicating below mean policy status within their respective groups and the peer group spatial 
lag variable. In substantive terms, a move from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the peer group 
specific spatial lag variable increases the predicted count of terrorist policies by roughly 6.5 
policies for the ones above average policy level within their group, but by almost 9 policies 
for the laggard countries. Note that this model also contradicts an explanation for peer-group 
specific spatial policy dependence that is potentially rival to our theory based on negative 
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externalities, namely that governments learn from their peers. Learning theories of spatial 
policy dependence can be distinguished into two types. The first type claims that governments 
facing a problem intentionally learn from more successful governments. This would suggest 
that countries that experience more international terrorism than expected implement the poli-
cies and regulations of governments that experience less terrorism than expected. These theo-
ries cannot explain why countries with below-mean levels of regulation relative to their peers 
implement more additional regulations than their peers above the mean. The second type of 
learning theories assumes that governments unintentionally learn from each other – by gov-
ernment officials talking to each other and learning about the policies in other countries. 
These theories would predict a general convergence of counterterrorist policies because after 
09/11 the number of international conferences and meetings on international terrorism in-
creased sharply. Yet, no such convergence can be observed in the data. In sum, the evidence 
from the data and the results from model 2 are consistent with an externality-based causal 
mechanism, but at odds with a learning-based mechanism. 
5. Robustness 
This section discusses the robustness of our findings to plausible changes to model specifica-
tion. To start with, given our theory predicts peer-group specific spatial policy dependence, 
one may wish to cluster observations at the estimation stage at the peer group rather than 
country level. All inferences remain intact if we employ such alternative clustering in model 
3, resulting in smaller standard errors throughout compared to the baseline model 1. 
Next, note that our theory is not formulated in a way that is suitable for fixed effects regres-
sion. For example, our first hypothesis makes predictions about the level of threat from inter-
national terrorism on counterterrorist policies, not predictions about comparatively minor 
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changes to this threat over the short period 2001 to 2008. In other words, it makes little sense 
throwing away all between variation in the data. However, for spatial lag variables there is 
always the risk that spatial clustering and spatial heterogeneity create spuriously significant 
results and such clustering and heterogeneity is best dealt with by including country fixed 
effects (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). In model 4, we therefore include such fixed effects 
together with a temporally lagged dependent variable in lieu of the time-constant initial policy 
level variable, which additionally allows us to control for catch-up dynamics. Most im-
portantly, the fixed effects model tests whether alternative explanations invalidate our exter-
nalities theory. For example, the variation we observe and explain could possibly also be ex-
plained by theories that categorize Western countries into three or four ‘families of nations’, 
namely Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian and Continental European countries. While such theories 
have been formulated to explain variation in welfare policies as path-dependent phenomena, 
they could, in principle, also be used to explain anti-terrorist policy styles. Because types of 
policy-making are path-dependent and therefore stable over time, they will be captured by the 
fixed effects specification since the fixed effects model ignores the between-variation entirely 
using only within variation to estimate parameters and therefore controls for cultural differ-
ences across countries (Plümper, Troeger and Manow 2005, Plümper and Troeger 2007, 
2011). Another example for a theory that exploits predominantly cross-sectional variation 
would be the proposition that a military-industrial-security complex determines security poli-
cies such as anti-terrorist regulations. Again, the potential influence of this factor would be 
approximately absorbed in the country fixed effects.9 
                                                 
9
  If one included military expenditures as a share of GDP as an admittedly crude proxy for the dynamic 
influence of the security-industrial complex, then the coefficient of this variable is close to zero, 
statistically insignificant and does not change the results of any of our models (results not shown). 
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The negative sign of the share of government cabinet portfolios held by right-wing parties in 
model 4 suggests that whilst we find no partisan effects on the level of counterterrorist poli-
cies, a move toward more right-wing parties over time results, unexpectedly, in fewer rather 
than more policies. Most importantly, however, given the fixed effects model was estimated 
with this variable in mind, we continue to find a positive and statistically significant effect for 
the peer group specific spatial lag variable that is also not dramatically different in size com-
pared to the estimations without country fixed effects. Though we doubt that a fixed effects 
model represents a correctly specified model here, our main result still holds if we disregard 
all between-variation in the data. 
It is possible to argue that cultural factors not only result in the spatial clustering of countries, 
which can be controlled for in the fixed effects specification of model 4, as argued above, but 
also explain different adjustment to shocks and therefore different dynamic trajectories. We 
tested this possibility by generating spatial lag variables based on grouping countries into An-
glo-Saxons (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States), 
Scandinavians (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Central Continental Europeans (Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland), and Southern Europeans (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain). These spatial lag variables have no statistically significant effect on 
counterterrorist regulations if added to our set of explanatory variables in model 5, leaving the 
results hardly affected.10 
Figure 1 demonstrates that there is no consistent common trend of countries increasing their 
regulatory level over time. Nevertheless, we further test the robustness of our results to 
dealing with common trends. Firstly, in model 6 we replace the linear year trend variable with 
the year-specific fixed effects, which leaves our inferences about a peer-specific spatial policy 
                                                 
10
  The same applies if we group the Southern and Central Europeans together into one Continental 
European group (not reported). 
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effect intact: even if the estimated coefficient is now statistically significantly different from 
zero merely at the 10 per cent level, the coefficient from model 6 is not statistically 
significantly different from the one of baseline model 1. Secondly, in model 7 we include an 
additional spatial lag based on unitary weights, in which the policies of all other countries 
count equally. This spatial lag can control for the possibility that countries simply adjust their 
policies in line with what all other countries do, possibly as the result of diffuse or 
unintentional learning discussed in the previous section. Additionally, we include a further 
spatial lag variable based on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), taken from 
the Correlates of War project, as weights.11 The CINC is often taken as a proxy for the power 
of a country. Hence, this spatial lag variable is supposed to capture any pressure that more 
powerful states might exert on other countries to bring their policies more in line with their 
own ones. We find no evidence for pressure effects as cause for spatial policy dependence or 
that countries simply follow what all the other countries do, whereas our main results fully 
uphold. 
In model 8, we disaggregate the peer group spatial lag variable, allowing for separate spatial 
effects from peers of low exposure, medium exposure and high exposure, respectively. We do 
not find statistically significant differences in the strength of peer group spatial dependence 
for the groups of low and medium exposure. However, there is a significantly stronger degree 
of spatial policy dependence among the group of high exposure countries (the UK and the 
US). Yet, the positive and statistically significant coefficients of the spatial lag variables for 
peers of low and medium exposure clearly demonstrate that the effect of peer group specific 
spatial policy dependence is not exclusively driven by the group of high exposure. Not 
surprisingly therefore, the single peer specific spatial lag variable remains statistically 
significant even if one dropped the UK and the US from the sample (results not shown). 
                                                 
11
  www.correlatesofwar.org/ (last accessed 29 July 2012). 
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In models 9 to 11, we employ the three alternative classification schemes, introduced above, 
for placing countries into their respective peer groups. As can be seen, the estimated degree of 
peer group specific spatial policy dependence decreases across the different classification 
schemes employed compared to the main estimation model, going down to 0.392 in model 8 
and thus about half the value of model 1, while standard errors increase. However, despite 
these changes in the estimate, the peer-effect we are interested in remains positive and signifi-
cant at conventional levels so that our inferences remain intact. Uncertainty about the correct 
classification of countries does not change the fundamental inference that countries only spa-
tially depend in their counterterrorist policy choices on the choices of their peer group coun-
tries and ignore the policy choices of countries outside their peer group. 
In model 12, we deal with the issue that the terrorist threat level is also affected by counterter-
rorist policies, which creates some reverse causality. Whilst a higher threat level leads to more 
stringent counterterrorist policies, these in turn should lower the threat level. However, the 
evidence suggests that the first causal mechanism must be much stronger than the second one. 
Generally, the countries with higher threat tend to have higher counterterrorist policies, 
corroborating the first causal mechanism, whereas if the second causal mechanism dominated 
they would face lower threat. This is not to say that counterterrorist policies do not affect 
terrorist threat at all. They do, but not strongly enough to change the relative ranking of 
countries into low, medium and high threat level. In other words, the stringent American 
counterterrorist policies, for example, are likely to have lowered the threat level faced by 
Americans, but predominantly so on American soil with little effect on terrorist threat abroad 
and not sufficiently so to catapult the US out of the group of high threat level. Nevertheless, to 
disperse any endogeneity concerns, we estimated model 11 based on spatial lag variables, in 
which countries are classified into threat levels based on actual incidents in the pre-9/11 
period, namely 1996 to 2000. Again, our results uphold. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results from Robustness Tests. 
 
  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Robustness test: 
Clustering 
on peer 
groups 
Country fixed 
effects & LDV 
Incl. spatial 
lags based on 
policy culture 
groupings 
 
 
Year fixed 
effects 
Incl. unitary-  
and power- 
weighted 
spatial lags 
 
Separate 
spatial lags 
for each group 
 
Class. 
based on actual 
incidents 
 
Class. based 
on predicted 
killings 
 
Class.based 
on actual 
killings 
Class. based 
on actual in- 
cidents (1996-
2000) 
International terrorist threat 0.00167**  0.00130** 0.00190** 0.00624 0.00108** 0.00195** 0.000790** 0.000628** 0.00246** 
 (0.000141)  (0.000230) (0.000388) (0.00344) (0.000302) (0.000362) (0.000131) (0.000177) (0.000382) 
Spatial lag (peers) 0.762** 0.793** 0.713** 0.524# 0.759**  0.686** 0.392** 0.429** 0.733** 
 (0.0580) (0.163) (0.174) (0.306) (0.192)  (0.105) (0.127) (0.163) (0.0983) 
Spatial lag (peers of low exposure)   
   0.693**     
   
   (0.161)     
Spatial lag (peers of medium exposure) 
     0.744**     
 
     (0.130)     
Spatial lag (peers of high exposure) 
     1.428**     
 
     (0.182)     
Spatial lag (non-peers) 0.0160 -0.0285 0.131 -0.328 0.0523 -0.0368 0.0230 -0.144 -0.252 -0.115 
 (0.0305) (0.208) (0.342) (0.445) (0.399) (0.160) (0.215) (0.235) (0.238) (0.215) 
Spatial lag (policy culture peers) 
  0.316        
 
  (0.193)        
Spatial lag (policy culture non-peers) 
  -0.345        
 
  (0.367)        
Spatial lag (unitary weights) 
    -0.546      
 
    (0.388)      
Spatial lag (CINC-weighted) 
    0.976      
 
    (0.703)      
Initial policy level in 2000 0.0201**  0.0291** 0.0164** 0.0269** 0.0226** 0.0274** 0.0428** 0.0215 0.000566 
 (0.00497)  (0.00810) (0.00822) (0.00828) (0.00707) (0.00907) (0.00931) (0.0195) (0.0134) 
Policy level (t-1) 
 0.0116         
 
 (0.00965)         
GDP per capita 
-0.0181** 0.0610 -0.0113** -0.0171** -0.0186** -0.0188** -0.0187** -0.0138* -0.0138 -0.0272** 
 (0.00125) (0.0459) (0.00435) (0.00532) (0.00534) (0.00545) (0.00587) (0.00694) (0.00790) (0.00743) 
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% gov_left 
-0.00188** -0.00156 -0.00206 -0.00127 -0.00211 -0.00259 -0.00248 -0.00295 -0.00221 -0.00357* 
 (0.000572) (0.00124) (0.00143) (0.00163) (0.00170) (0.00163) (0.00169) (0.00240) (0.00228) (0.00146) 
% gov_right 
-0.00108** -0.00281* -0.00157 -0.000860 -0.00115 -0.00124 -0.00122 -0.00183 -0.00159 -0.00304* 
 (0.000115) (0.00135) (0.00140) (0.00153) (0.00167) (0.00154) (0.00198) (0.00186) (0.00206) (0.00142) 
year 0.0312* -0.0174 0.0356*  0.0378 0.0513* 0.0367 0.0846** 0.0953** 0.0553* 
 (0.0137) (0.0352) (0.0182)  (0.0223) (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.0223) (0.0266) (0.0266) 
Note: Poisson regressions on number of counter-terrorist policies in place. N = 160. Standard errors clustered on country in brackets. Coefficient of 
constant not reported. # statistically significant at 0.1, * at 0.05, or ** 0.01 level. 
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6. Conclusion 
Predominantly defensive counterterrorist measures create negative externalities, but they do 
not result in an unconditional global ‘race to the top’, in which all countries converge toward 
the highest possible regulatory level. Instead, the negative externalities and their policy effects 
are confined to groups of countries at a similar level of threat from international Islamist 
terrorism. Spatial dependence in counterterrorist policies thus exclusively stems from these 
peer countries, whereas governments can safely ignore regulations enacted by countries 
outside their peer group. The spatial effect in defensive counterterrorism is confined to peers. 
We have found broad support for these predictions in our empirical analysis of counterterror-
ist regulations enacted by Western developed country democracies in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks. We have demonstrated that our inferences are robust to plausible changes in model 
specification. In particular, we continue to find evidence for the peer effect even if we control 
for learning and pressure from powerful countries as alternative mechanisms of spatial policy 
dependence and independently of how we sort countries into peer groups. The peer effect also 
persists in a model with country fixed effects, which is not well suited to test our theory but 
indicates that the peer effect is not spuriously driven by spatial clustering and unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity or alternative theories that make predictions about factors whose influ-
ence is predominantly time-invariant over the period of our study.  
Our analysis suggests that the peer effect is crucial for a better understanding of the heteroge-
neous response of Western countries to the shock of 9/11. Spatial policy dependence within 
groups of similar countries together with no spatial policy dependence emanating from coun-
tries outside a country’s peer group is a phenomenon likely to exist well beyond counterter-
rorist policies. For example, we speculate that peer effects are prevalent in environmental 
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policies, economic policies in general and fiscal policies during contagious debt crises in par-
ticular as well as in many other policies. Our research, thus, has wider implications for stim-
ulating future research in other policy areas and makes contributions that go beyond the nar-
row case of counterterrorist regulations that we have analyzed here. 
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Figure 1. Patterns of Counterterrorist Policies by country together with transformed peer and non-peer spatial lag variables. 
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Note: 1 refers to the peer group of low threat; 2 to medium threat and 3 to high threat. 
39 
APPENDIX. Descriptive statistical variable information. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Counterterrorist policies 13.14 6.72 1 28
International terrorist threat 27.92 72.74 0.83 338.10
Spatial lag (peers) 2.50 0.51 1.22 3.37
Spatial lag (non-peers) 2.65 0.40 1.59 3.09
Initial policy level in 2000 3.75 3.20 0 13
GDP per capita (in thousand USD) 25.19 7.63 11.40 41.90
% gov_left 37.02 40.08 0 100
% gov_right 43.01 39.74 0 100
 
 
